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PATCHING OLD WINESKINS: HEIGHTENED
DEFERENCE TOWARDS SAIBAN-IN FINDINGS OF FACT
ON KOSO APPEAL IS NOT ENOUGH
Caleb Jon F. Vandenbos †
Abstract: The successful introduction of the saiban-in seido—the Japanese lay
assessor system—was a tremendous step towards creating meaningful exchange between
the public and the judiciary and democratizing the criminal justice system in Japan. To
preserve the quality of this exchange, judges must conscientiously solicit and respect lay
assessor input during deliberations, and saiban-in decisions must retain their force on
appeal. Under current appellate procedure, however, saiban-in findings of fact may be
replaced on koso appeal. Koso appeals threaten to eviscerate lay participants’
contributions in the individual case being reviewed and, in the long term, will discourage
judges from taking lay assessors’ contributions seriously during jury deliberations.
Although the Supreme Court of Japan has affirmed the unique capacity of saiban-in
panels to assess credibility and make factual determinations, a 2012 Supreme Court
decision threatened the panels’ responsibility by failing to impose a higher standard of
review for reviewing the factual findings of saiban-in trials. Even if it had adopted a
higher standard, such standards are subject to erosion over time as judges apply them in
individual cases. To ensure the vitality of the saiban-in’s contribution to the Japanese
criminal justice system, the Supreme Court of Japan should eliminate koso appeals
courts’ ability to replace saiban-in findings of fact on appeal.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“[N]o one puts new wine into old wineskins; or else the new wine
bursts the wineskins, the wine is spilled, and the wineskins are ruined. But
new wine must be put into new wineskins.”1
The reforms that took place at the turn of the millennium in Japan
have been described as equal in significance to those of the Meiji
Restoration and the Occupation.2 Arguably, the crowning achievement of
these reforms was the saiban-in seido—the Japanese lay assessor system—
whereby laypersons are selected randomly from the public to sit on panels
with professional judges to decide criminal cases. The saiban-in seido has
†
The author would like to thank Professors John Haley and Daniel Foote for their comments and
support while drafting.
1
Mark 2:22 (King James).
2
Setsuo Miyazawa, Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System Reform in
Japan: An Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 313, 314 (2013)
(“[T]he recommendations of the [Justice System Reform Council] were so comprehensive that they could
be considered as the third major series of reforms of the modern legal system in Japan, following the first
wave of major reforms in the late 19th century and the second major wave of reforms introduced after
World War II.”).
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certainly been the most visible of the millennium reforms.3 Although the
saiban-in is new, the appellate procedure into which it is placed is old.
Pouring the new wine of lay participation into the old wineskins of presaiban-in appellate procedure threatens to undermine the saiban-in’s
influence and to spoil the contribution it was intended to make.
Part II of this comment briefly reviews the millennium reforms, and
the historical and spiritual significance of the saiban-in seido. Part III
describes current appellate procedure in Japan, and explains why the
capacity of appellate judges to replace facts on appeal threatens to
compromise the goals behind the saiban-in. Part IV reviews a Supreme
Court of Japan decision that indicates a move toward establishing a
heightened standard of review for saiban-in findings. Part V of this
comment argues that even if the Court were to institute a heightened
standard for saiban-in findings, this protection would still not be sufficient
to protect lay participants’ contributions. Instead, the Court should move
strongly to protect saiban-in input, and end the appellate practice that allows
judges to replace facts on appellate review.
II.

THE SAIBAN-IN SEIDO AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

A.

The Saiban-in Seido

Responding to a perceived need to improve the quality of justice in
Japan, the Japanese Diet4 introduced the saiban-in seido—or lay assessor
system—into the criminal justice system in 2004; it went into effect in
2009.5 The saiban-in seido is a system of joint decision making,6 whereby
professional judges and laypersons together find facts and determine the
sentence of a criminal defendant. 7 Only in cases involving crimes
punishable by death or indefinite imprisonment, or in cases in which a
victim has died, is the saiban-in mandated under the system.8 The saiban-in
3
See Daniel H. Foote, Citizen Participation: Appraising the Saiban’in System, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L.
L. REV. 755, 756 (2014).
4
While the Japanese Diet is made up of an upper and lower house, called the House of
Representatives and the House of Councilors, respectively, this comment will refer to them collectively as
“the Diet” or “the Japanese Diet.” See Relationship to Other Bodies, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE
NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN, available at www.sanglin.go.jp/eng/guide/relation/index.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2015).
5
See John O. Haley, Japan, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 393, 398 (Kevin
Jon Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011).
6
1 Saiban’in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru horitsu, Law No. 63 of 2004, translated in Kent
Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act
Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233, 233 (2005).
7
See id. at 240-41, art. 6.
8
See id. at 236-38, art. 2(1)(i), (ii).
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system borrows features of European and Anglo-American criminal justice
models, but is not identical to any other system in the world.9
In most circumstances, saiban-in panels are made up of three judges
and six lay assessors.10 Saiban-in members are randomly selected from the
voting population,11 and may be subject to dismissal for specific reasons.12
Like professional judges, lay participants may ask questions of witnesses,13
victims,14 and the defendant.15 To secure a guilty verdict, a simple majority
that includes at least one lay assessor and one judge is necessary.16 The
same majority is sufficient for determining a sentence, except in cases where
the majority does not include both a lay assessor and a professional judge.
In such a situation, the vote most unfavorable to the defendant is counted
with the next most unfavorable until such a majority is reached.17 The chief
judge manages the panel during proceedings. She must update and educate
lay assessors on legal rulings or court procedural decisions.18 In addition,
she must “conscientiously explain[] the necessary laws or ordinances to the
lay assessors, making arrangements so that deliberations are easily
understandable . . . [and] provid[e] sufficient opportunity for the lay
assessors to voice their opinions . . . so that lay assessors are sufficiently able
to execute their duties.”19 Lay assessors, as well as judges, are ‘entrusted’ to
freely decide the issues before them “based on the strength of the
evidence.”20 However, they are prohibited from disclosing ‘secrets’ learned
during deliberations.21 Further, they may not disclose ‘the particulars’ they
are “allowed to hear, or the opinions of any of the panelists and who voiced
them.”22 The lay assessors may be punished for disclosing such secrets.23
9

See id. at 234.
See id. at 237, art. 2(2). There is an exception. A panel may consist of only one judge and four
assessors if the court “decide[s] that it is appropriate” and there is “no dispute concerning the facts.” Id. at
237, art. 3. To date, there has been no saiban-in trials where such a ratio was employed.
11
See id. at 243, art. 13.
12
See id. at 256-57, 260-62, art. 34, 41.
13
See id. at 267, art. 56-57.
14
See id. at 268, art. 58.
15
See id. at 268, art. 59.
16
See id. at 273, art. 67(1).
17
See id. at 273, art. 67(2) (“[T]he number of opinions for the option most unfavorable to the
defendant will be added to the number of opinions for the next favorable option, until a majority opinion of
the members of the judicial panel which includes both an empanelled judge and a lay assessor holding that
opinion is achieved.”).
18
See id. at 273, art. 66(3).
19
Id. at 273, art. 66(5).
20
Id. at 268-269, art. 62.
21
See id. at 242, art. 9(2).
22
Id. at 274-75, art. 70.
23
Id. at 277-78, art. 79.
10
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The Saiban-in is Significant to Democratic Ideals Because it Was
Introduced in Response to the Opacity of the Justice System

The introduction of the saiban-in seido was, and continues to be,
greatly significant to democratic ideals in Japan. This significance likely
does not stem from its potential and actual effects on individual defendants
alone. Instead, the saiban-in’s significance stems from what it symbolizes: a
democratic solution to the opacity of criminal justice in Japan, and the
triumphal return of lay participation after the failure of the pre-World War II
jury system.
Prior to the millennial reforms, Japanese law scholar Ryuichi Hirano
made his now famous statement that “[t]he Japanese criminal justice system
is rather hopeless.”24 At the time of his statement, criminal processes in
Japan had long been criticized. Although formally adversarial, Japan’s
criminal procedure has followed its European heritage closely25 and was—at
least until the introduction of the saiban-in—predominantly inquisitorial.26
Criminal trials were heavily document-based,27 contributing to the criticism
that the Japanese trial was “trial by dossier.”28 This dossier was assembled
by the prosecutor’s office—a major actor in both criminal prosecution and
investigation in Japan29—while defense counsel played little, if any, role in
its assembly.30 Confessions were (and still are) extracted from defendants
kept for interrogation for long periods of time prior to arrest,31 and evidence
of guilt weighs heavily on such confessions.32 Typical of the system’s
reliance on documents, these confessions were presented to the court as
summaries written by the investigator.33 Ninety percent of cases in Japan
involve a confession,34 and although persons are presumed innocent,35 the
24

Ryuichi Hirano, Genko keijisosho no shindan [Diagnosis of Current Criminal Procedure], in
DANDO SHIGEMITSU HAKUSHI KOKI SHUKUGA RONBUNSH [COLLECTION OF WORKS TO COMMEMORATE
THE SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY OF DR. SHIGEMITSU DANDO] 407, 407 (Yasuhara Hiraba et al. eds., 1985),
translated in 22 LAW IN JAPAN 129, 129 (1989).
25
The Japanese legal system has long been influenced by continental models. See Haley, supra note
5, at 394; see also Arne F. Soldwedel, Testing Japan’s Convictions: The Lay Judge System and the Rights
of Criminal Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1417, 1423 (2008) (discussing how the lay judge
system is heavily modeled on European mixed jury or lay judge systems).
26
See Haley, supra note 5, at 397-98.
27
CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN 479 (3rd ed. 2012); Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the
Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 265 (1999).
28
Kiss, supra note 27.
29
See David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, 41 CRIME & JUST. 35, 52 (2012).
30
GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 477.
31
Id. at 467.
32
Johnson, supra note 29, at 52.
33
GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 489.
34
Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency,
More Access, and More Time, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487, 509 (2010).
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conviction rate is still 93 to 98 percent for contested cases. 36 This
predictability elicited criticism that the Japanese criminal trial was a ritual
matter in which the court merely confirmed the prosecutor’s determination
of guilt by reviewing the prosecutor’s dossier.37
The millennial reforms aimed to alleviate the obscurity 38 —and
sometimes secrecy39—of the criminal justice system to the public. This
obscurity has been perpetuated, at least in part, by the veiled and cloistered
existence of one of the trial court’s key figures: the judge. Prior to the
introduction of the saiban-in, professional judges were the sole arbiters of
guilt and sentencing in all cases.40 One reason for having career judges
arbitrate facts and sentences was conformity between judgments,41 and Japan
does enjoy “a high degree of nationwide consistency in adjudication.”42
Judges undergo a rigorous legal training 43 meant to produce ethical,
professional, and elite civil servants who will work hard and remain
independent.44 Judges graduate from undergraduate law programs, and go
through the Legal Research and Training Institute.45 Most judges graduate
from elite schools, and spend their lives thereafter working alongside fellow
judges until retirement at age sixty.46 However, while this training works to
produce a judiciary that is “by all reliable accounts . . . the most
35

See Haley, supra note 5, at 397.
See Johnson, supra note 29, at 48.
See GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 479; see also Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of
Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317, 338-39 (1992).
38
Consider prosecution review commissions, whereby laypersons check the prosecutor’s decision
not to prosecute. See, e.g., Mark D. West, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the
Problem of Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 700 (1992) (“Prosecution review
commissions remained virtually unknown in Japan through the late 1980s . . . [O]ne Nagasaki woman who
received a notice for ‘jury duty’ was so frightened to receive something from what she assumed to be the
prosecutor’s office that she committed suicide on the spot by drinking herbicide.”).
39
Consider, for example, the death penalty. After a random questioning of thirty Japanese citizens,
one expert wrote that “[s]everal did not know that death is delivered by hanging in Japan (a
misunderstanding I encountered in numerous other conversations), and most knew nothing about the social
isolation that surrounds inmates on Japan’s death row.” David T. Johnson, Japan’s Secretive Death
Penalty Policy: Contours, Origins, Justifications, and Meanings, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 62, 115
(2006).
40
Joseph J. Kodner, Re-Introducing Lay Participation to Japanese Criminal Cases: An Awkward Yet
Necessary Step, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 231, 236 (2003).
41
Id. at 237.
42
Haley, supra note 5, at 397.
43
See id. at 396; see also Overview of the Judicial System in Japan, Judges of the Lower Courts,
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicial_sys/overview_of/overview/index.html#08 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2015).
44
John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. &
DISP. RESOL. 121, 139 (2002).
45
J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Hangs Whom for What? The Death Penalty in Japan, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 365, 372-73 (2012).
46
Id.
36
37
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autonomous, corruption-free and trusted judiciary in the world,”47 it also
obscures the criminal process from the public, and weakens the connection
between the justice system and the people. In fact, one of the goals of the
Japanese Federation of Bar Association (“JFBA”) for the millennium
reforms was to counter this weakening by introducing lay participation into
the justice system. By introducing lay participation, the bar association
sought to ensure respect for the presumption of innocence and the reasonable
doubt standard in the courtroom.48
The Japanese criminal justice system’s failures were made apparent to
the public with a series of false convictions that came to light between 1983
and 1989. During this time, four famous death row inmates were recognized
as wrongfully accused and convicted and were subsequently exonerated.49
The prosecutions of all four used confessions that had been coerced from the
accused during long interrogations.50 Prior to their exonerations, the victims
had spent between twenty-eight to thirty-three years in prison, many on
death row.51 These cases may have helped to bring the issue of false
confessions to the public eye,52 and caused justice officials to begin thinking
about structural change.53
C.

The Process by Which the Saibain-in was Introduced, the History of
Lay Participation, and the Public’s Interest in the Saibain-in
Demonstrates its Significance to Democratic Ideals

The Japanese justice system’s opacity prompted calls for lay
participation before the 1990s,54 but the false convictions of the 1980s—
combined with political influences that existed in the late 1990s—created
“the serendipity of events”55 that led the JFBA to propose comprehensive

47

Haley, supra note 44.
Foote, supra note 3, at 758 (“For the organized bar, key objectives [to introducing the lay assessor
system] were achieving true respect for the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard
and preventing miscarriages of justice.”).
49
Kazuko Ito, Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in Japan, 80 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1245, 1254 (2012).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 461.
53
Daniel H. Foote, From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 11, 13 (1992).
54
For an excellent and thorough review of the events leading up to the reforms, see Setsuo
Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 313-14; see also Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the
Japanese Justice System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (Saiban-in
Seido) from Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspectives, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
935, 939 (2004).
55
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 939.
48
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judicial reform in 1999.56 The Japanese Diet passed the Act to Establish the
Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) on June 30, 1999,57 and the JSRC
eventually published findings recommending lay participation in trials,
leading to the establishment of the saiban-in seido.
The saiban-in seido is significant to democratic ideals in great part
because of the democratic process by which the JSRC was formed. The
JSRC was established independently from the dominant forces of the justice
system—the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the JFBA. 58
Instead it was established directly under the Cabinet.59 In fact, the JSRC
was made up predominantly of laypersons. In addition to a former chief
judge, former prosecutor, and former JFBA president, the JSRC’s members
included three law professors, two business people, the president of a
university federation, a professor of accounting, the president of the Nippon
Foundation, a representative from the largest labor organization in Japan, a
representative from a consumer organization, and a novelist. 60 The
deliberations were open to the public, and individuals could voice their
opinions to the panel.61 The success of the JSRC’s recommendations was “a
major achievement”62 because it was “the first time that major reforms [had
been] successfully proposed by a government committee as national
policies.”63
The government imposed lofty goals on the JSRC. In addition to
“clarifying the role to be played by justice in Japanese society in the 21st
century,”64 the JSRC was to examine and deliberate on reforms to effect a
justice system that was “easy for the people to utilize,”65 that included some
manner of public participation, and was optimized to “achieve [the] legal
profession as it should be.”66 After two years of deliberations, the JSRC
published its recommendations for reform in 2001.67

56

Kazuko Ito, supra note 49 at 1256-57.
Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 317.
Id. at 313-14.
59
JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001), available at
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
60
Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 317.
61
Id. at 318.
62
Id. at 326.
63
Id.
64
JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59 (citing Shihō kaikaku shingi-kai secchi hō [Act on
the Establishment of the Justice System Reform Council] Law no. 68/1999) (Japan)).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 320.
57
58
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The JSRC described its recommendations as part of a process by
which the fundamental ethic of Japanese self-government was to be changed
for the better:
Japan, which is facing difficult conditions, has been working on
various reforms, including political reform, administrative
reform, promotion of decentralization, and reforms of the
economic structure such as deregulation. What commonly
underlies these reforms is the will that each and every person
will break out of the consciousness of being a governed object
and will become a governing subject, with autonomy and
bearing social responsibility, and that the people will participate
in building a free and fair society in mutual cooperation and
will work to restore rich creativity and vitality to this country.
This reform of the justice system aims to tie these various
reforms together organically.68
The JSRC saw the role of the people in self-governance as essential:
The people, who are the governing subjects . . . must participate
in the administration of justice[,] . . . must . . . maintain places
for rich communication with the legal profession, and must
themselves realize and support the justice system for the
people. For justice to achieve the role demanded of it[,] . . .
broad popular support . . . [is] necessary . . . . [T]he judicial
branch must establish a popular base by meeting the demand
for accountability to the people.69
It was under the heading “Establishment of the Popular Base of the Justice
System” that the JSRC explained the need for lay participation at trial:
[I]t is incumbent on the people to break out of the excessive
dependency on the state that accompanies the traditional
consciousness of being governed objects . . . . In the field of the
judiciary which plays an integral part . . . of the existing

68
69

JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59.
Id. at 131.
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governance structure based on popular sovereignty, the people
also are expected to participate broadly.70
Under the same section, the JSRC proposed the saiban-in seido, stating:
[P]opular participation in [litigation] proceedings has very
important significance as a measure to establish the popular
base of the justice system . . . . [T]hrough having the people
participate in the trial process, and through having the sound
social common sense of the public reflected more directly in
trial decisions, the people’s understanding and support of the
justice system will deepen and it will be possible for the justice
system to achieve a firmer popular base . . . . [A] new system
should be introduced . . . enabling the broad general public to
cooperate with judges by sharing responsibilities, and to take
part autonomously and meaningfully in deciding trials.71
When the JSRC published its recommendations, it seemed that the
introduction of lay participation was “a forgone outcome.” 72 Ultimate
responsibility for the implementation of the saiban-in seido was delegated to
the Lay Assessor/Penal Matters Study Investigation Committee (“the
Investigation Committee”).73 By 2004, the Investigation Committee had
finished its work and the Japanese Diet enacted the Act Concerning
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials. 74 In 2009, the first
saiban-in trial took place.75
The saiban-in was a central tenant of the reforms, more so than most
other parts of the JSRC’s recommendations. The JSRC’s recommendations
were meant to revitalize the criminal justice system by many means—
including the introduction of post-graduate law schools, the relaxation of
standards for passing the bar, and the endowment of then-existing lay person
prosecution review commissions that were not only able to recommend, but
also compel prosecution, and the expansion of access to legal services for
the public.76 In the eyes of the JSRC, however, the saiban-in was one of
70

Id. at 211.
Id. at 213.
72
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 940.
73
Id.
74
See Douglas G. Levin, Saiban-in-Seido: Lost in Translation? How the Source of Power
Underlying Japan's Proposed Lay Assessor System May Determine Its Fate, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J.
199, 200 (2008).
75
See Foote, supra note 3, at 756.
76
See JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59.
71
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“the three pillars of [the] reform.”77 However, given the other factors that
relate to the introduction of the saiban-in system, its importance is likely
even greater than stated by the JSRC.
In addition to the saiban-in’s central place in the JSRC’s efforts to
“establish[] the popular base of the justice system,” historical factors make
the saiban-in seido immensely significant. The saiban-in seido is not the
first attempt to introduce lay participation into criminal trials in Japan. The
Japanese criminal justice system employed juries in 1928, 78 but juries
became defunct due to lack of use and were officially suspended in 1943.79
For many years afterward, reformers unsuccessfully called for the
reintroduction of a jury system.80 However, in an attempt to curtail the
judicial tendency to rubber stamp criminal convictions, lay participation was
reintroduced to the Japanese court system in 2009. 81 Layperson
participation was reintroduced to the system in the hope that laypersons
would not be biased by daily work with prosecutors and would therefore be
better able to apply the presumption of innocence. 82 Indeed, these
aspirations were justified based on previous experience. The acquittal rate
by pre-WWII juries was 15.4 percent, while the acquittal rate of pre-WWII
professional judges was 1.3 percent to 3.7 percent. 83 The recently
introduced saiban-in seido has not attained the degree of disparity between
saiban-in outcomes and the outcomes of professional judge-made panels at
this stage in its development. However, the success of the JSRC’s initial call
for the reintroduction of laypersons to the court system—sixty-six years
after the pre-war jury was discontinued in 194384—was itself momentous.
Finally, the introduction of the saiban-in seido was also significant to
the Japanese public. The extensive media coverage the saiban-in received
demonstrates this significance.85 The public was highly interested in this
77

Id. at 212.
See Levin, supra note 74, at 203.
79
See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 962.
80
Kiss, supra note 27, at 264 (“The roots of the debate on the readoption of the jury trial . . . go far
deeper than a mere reaction to erroneous verdicts by judges.”); see also Foote, supra note 53, at 83-84
(“Reintroduction of the jury would have profound implications for criminal trials in Japan. Live witnesses
presumably would replace the heavy reliance on written witness statements, and questioning of the
defendant likely would take on greater formality.”).
81
See Kiss, supra note 27, at 264.
82
See Foote, supra note 53, at 84.
83
See id.
84
See David Johnson, Early Returns from Japan’s New Criminal Trials, THE ASIA-PACIFIC
JOURNAL: JAPAN FOCUS (2009), available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-David_T_-Johnson/3212.
85
See Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 2, at 326; see also Foote, supra note 3, at 756. For examples of
media coverage, see Setsuko Kamiya, Jury System for Criminal Trials Urged, THE JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 12,
1999), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/1999/12/21/national/jury-system-for-criminal-trials-urged; Panel
Calls for Juries in Criminal Trials, THE JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
78
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reform because it could affect every person.86 In order to help citizens and
judges prepare for the change, pamphlets, videos, and mock trials were made
available,87 and surveys were sent out to test the public’s willingness to
perform its duty.88 However, not all coverage was positive.89 In conclusion,
saiban-in’s historical significance, the media (and scholarly) fanfare that
attended its introduction, and the process by which it was introduced make
saiban-in one of the most visible, and perhaps the most significant, of the
millennial reforms.
D.

The Saiban-in is Significant to Democratic Ideals Because it Has
Demonstrated its Capacity to Influence the Justice System

While the saiban-in has democratic legitimacy and historical and
emotive significance as a symbol of democratic progress, it has also
demonstrated its capacity to do as it was intended: influence the justice
system.90 The introduction of lay participation through the saiban-in has
broken the professional judiciary and procuracy’s sole control over the
criminal trial. Lay participation has breathed fresh influence into the justice
system, and brought “orality and directness” 91 to the courtroom.
Significantly, trials are shifting away from exclusively using written witness
statements and confessions, and are instead employing live in-court
testimony and cross-examination.92 Attorneys now reportedly speak in more
plain terms.93
Presumably, these changes are ushering in better processes and results
for defendants. Mixed panels have not been shy to find acquittals on the
serious cases that come before them.94 In fact, contrary to concerns that the
2000/09/19/national/panel-calls-for-juries-in-criminal-trials; Mark Willacy, Japan Revives Jury Trials,
ABC (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-08-05/japan-revives-jury-trials/1379146.
86
Justin McCurry, Trial By Jury Returns to Japan, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/03/japan-trial-by-jury-returns; Japan’s Landmark Jury Trial
Ends, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 6, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8188447.stm.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/world/asia/16jury.html?ex=1342238400&en=e03e6e32d7b87f74&ei=
5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0.
88
See Foote, supra note 3, at 761.
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the mass media embarked on what can only be described as a campaign of saiban’in system bashing.”).
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See generally, Foote, supra note 3 (reviewing the diverse and salutary effects of the saiban-in
seido on the justice system in Japan).
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See id. at 773.
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Id. at 765.
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Id. at 767.
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Japanese lay public would merely be more retributive than professional
judges,95 the saiban-in has had a visible yet complex effect on sentencing.
For example, although in murder cases “there has been modest
increases . . . in sentences over [the past] fifteen years, there [has also] been
an even greater increase in sentences of less than five years.”96 Additionally,
there has been an increase in suspended sentences for several categories of
crimes, and an increase in the use of probation officers.97 “These figures
suggest a rather nuanced view, with harsher (by Japanese standards, at least)
sentences imposed in some cases, but on the whole, reflect[] considerable
faith in defendants' potential for rehabilitation.”98 Finally, the introduction
of the saiban-in has also “provided the impetus for renewed reflection on the
fundamental meaning and significance of the criminal justice system,”99
encouraging the introduction of other, long-called for reforms, such as
expanded discovery and the strengthening of the defense bar. 100 It is
heartening to see that the saiban-in seido has been making an impact, even
in its early tenure.
III.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM GUARANTEES LAY PARTICIPATION’S SURVIVAL,
BUT NOT ITS VITALITY

A.

Absent Legislative Action, the Saiban-in Seido Will Continue to Exist

As currently structured, the saiban-in seido’s survival is guaranteed
unless the legislature intervenes. Its success and vitality as a democratic
influence on the judiciary and justice system, however, are not as certain.
The saiban-in seido’s purpose is to “establish the popular base for the justice
system”101 by allowing lay persons to “participate in the administration of
justice autonomously and meaningfully.”102 However, the judges who work
with the public in their courtrooms are predominantly responsible for
ensuring the meaningfulness of this exchange, not the Japanese public. This
is because only about 12,000 lay assessors (including alternates) will
deliberate each year, and these 12,000 lay assessors will only sit on one case
per service.103 The quality of lay participants’ contribution to the judicial
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

See Foote, supra note 3, at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 773.
Id.
JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 59.
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See Foote, supra note 3, at 769.
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system will depend ultimately on whether or not judges respect lay
participants’ input during and after trial, and the effect jurors’ input has on
career judges over the long run. Therefore, in order for the reform to be
successful, it is essential that judges respect layperson input.
As a preliminary matter, there is no concern that saiban-in trials will
fall into disuse under the current system. Japan’s failed attempt at lay
participation helps to assuage this concern. Trials by jury were initially
popular when Japan instituted its jury system in 1928.104 By 1943, jury
usage had declined so precipitously that the institution’s influence on the
criminal justice system was virtually non-existent.105 While the decline may
have been attributable to the developing fascism of the pre-WWII era, this
reason is probably not exclusive.106 Procedural factors, in addition to the
fact that defendants could decline a jury trial, probably contributed most to
the disuse of juries. For example, although juries were generally more
lenient than professional judges,107 a jury’s decision could be set aside and a
new jury empaneled if the judge felt that the verdict was in error,108 which
happened often. In addition, defendants could not mitigate the sentence of a
jury on appeal.109 These procedural features, as well as the fact that it was
more expensive and time consuming for defense attorneys to conduct a trial
by jury, likely contributed to juries’ unpopularity. 110 This unpopularity
would have been irrelevant if juries were mandatory for some or all cases,
but under the pre-war system, defendants often had the right to choose to be
tried by a judge or jury.111
In contrast, the current saiban-in system will not suffer the same fate
as Japan’s pre-WWII jury system because it denies defendants the right to
choose to be tried by a saiban-in panel.112 Thus, the saiban-in is hardwired
into the system: as long as the prosecutor continues charging the qualifying
crimes and the legislature does not discontinue the system, the saiban-in
seido will live on.
104

See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 54, at 963 (143 were held in the first year of jury trials in

Japan).
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See id. (In their final year, only two jury trials were held.).
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considerations.”).
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Id. at 269.
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Although the Saiban-in will Survive, its Enduring Vitality as a
Democratic Influence on the Judicial System Is Less Certain

Although making trial by saiban-in mandatory may avoid the fate of
Japan’s original experiment in lay participation, it does nothing to avoid the
loss of its vitality. The possibility that Japan’s mixed panels will lose their
vigor as potent forces of democratic influence in the judiciary—thus failing
to fulfill their purpose of establishing democratic exchange between the
public and the judicial system—is no idle fear. Germany’s mixed-court
system is similar to Japan’s system in many ways, and, despite its seventyyear tenure, it has been criticized for providing no real exchange between lay
participants and the judiciary.
Japanese criminal procedure borrows heavily from German models.113
“German law and legal science continue to exert strong influence” over
Japan .114 The German system is predominantly inquisitional in nature. 115
For example, German prosecution has typically been paper-based, with
prosecutors preparing large files of evidence to be presented to a panel.116
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that Japan’s mixed-court system bears many
similarities to Germany’s system.117 In Germany, like Japan, “lay judges”
sit alongside professional judges to decide guilt and sentence.118 The judge
also has control over drafting the summary that will be given to the appellate
court on appeal after the verdict, similar to the Japanese system. 119
Moreover, in both systems, only professional judges can sit on appeal.120
The similarity between Japan’s saiban-in seido system and Germany’s
mixed court system serves as a portent of things to come for the Japanese
system.121 The efficacy of German lay judges in affecting outcomes has
been seriously criticized. Critics have said that German lay judges tend to
be passive, and few cases resolved by a mixed-court panel “necessarily
reflect lay participation of any kind.”122 Cases tried by a mixed panel “may
be—and most often are—decided by the professional judge or judges to
whose authority the lay judges generally defer both at trial and during
113

David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, 41 CRIME & JUST. 35, 39-40 (2012).
Haley, supra note 5, at 394.
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Thomas Weigend, Germany, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 252, 257
(Kevin Jon Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011).
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See Kodner, supra note 40, at 247.
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See id. at 246.
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deliberations.”123 This deference is so great that lay judge presence may be
merely ‘honorary’:124
[A] review of the professional literature and the popular press,
combined with trial observations and conversations with
professional and lay judges, prosecutors, and former judicial
clerks, strongly suggest that German lay judges play an
insignificant and largely symbolic role in the administration of
criminal justice.125
In fact, in most cases, “it is well known that . . . lay judges go along with
what the professional judges suggest.”126
However, differences do exist between the development of the
Japanese saiban-in system and the German lay judge system. For example,
German lay judges were formerly prohibited from viewing the prosecutor’s
dossier and lay judges had to make up their minds based upon the evidence
presented at trial alone.127 This may have created a culture of lay judge
independence that carried through to today, despite the fact that the dossier
is now open to lay judges. In contrast, Japanese saiban-in members were
never subject to this limitation, so perhaps such a culture will not develop.
Not all the differences that exist between the two systems bode well for
Japanese lay participation’s health, however. German lay judges serve for
terms of five years,128 whereas saiban-in participants only sit for one case.
Although sitting for only one case may help prevent saiban-in duties from
becoming routine for individual lay participants, and may keep them
engaged with the process, it will also give professional judges the upper
hand in every deliberation. Unlike German lay judges, Japanese lay
participants will not have time to develop experience with the law and the
practices of the courtroom. Presumably, this will prevent them from
developing the confidence and rapport in the courtroom that would allow
them to exchange with professional judges on more equal footing.
In full fairness to the current saiban-in seido model, the judges who
administer it, and the Japanese public, assessments of the deliberations by
saiban-in participants from the last six years have been positive. Although
lay assessors may not discuss the inner workings of the decision-making
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 247 n.114 (quoting Dubber, supra note 122, at 565).
Id. at 249.
Dubber, supra note 122, at 582.
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process 129 —a requirement that has not gone without criticism 130 —early
assessments of the process were positive. 131 Seventy percent of former
assessors say that they were able to talk and express themselves.132 It is also
encouraging that the judiciary seems to be enthusiastic about the saiban-in
seido.133 Further, the fact that saiban-in panels are having an effect on
sentencing outcomes may be seen as direct proof that the deliberators are
genuinely considering lay assessor input.
The novelty of the saiban-in seido creates suspicion in the long-term
sustainability of these positive reports. Certain features of the system have
been criticized for disadvantaging the saiban-in’s position in relation to
professional judges; 134 some of these features overlap with those of
Germany’s lay judge system.
German lay judges lost their independence and “languish in
obscurity”135 in part because “they do not participate in the formulation and
public announcement of the justification for the court's judgment.” 136
Similarly, in Japan, the court announces the judgment and sentence at the
conclusion of the deliberations,137 and the junior judge writes the opinion.138
Although the JSRC considered the option of having saiban-in members
participate in the publication of the opinion, 139 it ultimately decided that the
saiban-in members should not take part in this process. The JSRC stated
that “[e]ven when saiban-in participate, the contents of judgments should
fundamentally be structured in the same way as those for trials by judges
only, and judges should prepare the judgments based on the results of the
deliberations.” 140 Additionally, the JSRC declared it necessary that
“judgments set forth the substantial reasons [for the judgment], so as to . . .
obtain [the parties’ and general publics’] understanding and trust.”141 Lay
129
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assessors need not even appear at the announcement of the judgment. 142
Saiban-in members’ inability to participate in the drafting of the explanation
of the judgment and sentence is concerning, especially given its similarity to
Germany’s lay judge system.
The fact that lay assessors cannot, under penalty of a fine, discuss
their deliberations143 creates further concern. Critics argue that removing
this restriction will allow for more transparency in the deliberations in the
future.144 These criticisms and others are not meant to suggest that Japanese
judges will intentionally disregard lay participants’ contributions. The
Japanese judiciary’s integrity is widely accepted, 145 and judges seem
enthusiastic about the changes that are happening. 146 However, as the
system becomes commonplace, and the patience and energy necessary to
work with saiban-in on equal footing begins to counter its novelty, judges
may be tempted to represent the contributions of lay-persons more loosely.
By doing so, judges could get what they see as a just or reasonable result
without being accountable to the saiban-in. Therefore, it is imperative that
professional judges do not come to dominate deliberations, not only in the
immediate future, but also over the long run as the novelty and fanfare
surrounding the new system begin to fade.
C.

The Most Significant Threat to Meaningful Exchange Between the
Public and the Judiciary is the Appellate Judges’ Ability to Replace
Saiban-in Findings of Fact on Appeal

The greatest threat to the judiciary’s long-term respect for lay-person
input, and with it the potent force of democratic exchange between the
public and the judiciary, is the capacity of courts to find error in, and even
replace, saiban-in findings of fact on appeal. This capacity to circumvent
the saiban-in’s findings will encourage judges to take their deliberations
with laypersons less seriously because they know that improvidently found
facts can be re-found on appeal.

142
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Both the prosecution and defense have a right to appeal in Japan.147
Appeals may be made for error in the application of law,148 error in the
reasonableness of the sentence,149 and error in findings of fact.150 These
appeals are called koso appeals. Koso appeals courts may reverse a
judgment, amend the judgment, and/or enter a new one for any such error.151
There is no fundamental distinction between standards of review for findings
of fact by professional judges at the trial level, or professional judges on the
appellate level. Appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, consider
facts, assess credibility, and make their own factual determinations. It is not
uncommon for appellate courts to reverse acquittals or guilty findings.152
Judgment 2007 (A) No. 1785 (“No. 1785”)—a case without a saibanin panel—demonstrates appellate judges’ ability to reverse trial level
findings.153 In No. 1785, the defendant was accused of molesting a 17-year
old on the morning train.154 The prosecution presented the complaining
witnesses’ testimony, which consisted of her description of events, and her
identification of the defendant.155 The defendant denied the molestation.156
A panel of professional judges convicted the defendant at the trial level, and
the court of appeals affirmed.157 The Supreme Court of Japan reviewed the
evidence under Article 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
requires that “facts shall be found on the basis of evidence,” 158 and
concluded that the appellate court had erred. The Supreme Court did not
accept the credibility determination of the prior two panels and, contrary to
the trial court, found that:
147
KEIS SOSHŌHŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2007, art. 351 (Japan) available at
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452.
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[A]lthough the acts of molestation . . . alleged to have suffered
were considerably persistent and serious, [the complaining
witness] did not take any active action to avoid such acts within
the train, such behavior of [the complaining witness] does not
seem to be exactly consistent with [the complaining witness’]
active action to condemn the accused as described [earlier in the
testimony], and it was unnatural for [the complaining witness]
to have got off the train . . . but then returned.159
This opinion drew two dissents, including Justice Yukio Horigome’s, which
emphasized that the Supreme Court makes its decisions based only on
documentary evidence, in contrast to the trial court, which has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses in person.160 Nonetheless, the Court
ultimately concluded that “there [was] still room for doubt about the
credibility of [the complaining witness’] statements concerning the acts of
molestation that she alleged to have suffered,” and pronounced the defendant
not guilty.161 Courts of appeal are no less willing to reverse acquittals and
render guilty verdicts than they are to reverse guilty verdicts and render
acquittals.162
The process by which professional judges find facts on appeal has
been described in terms similar to de novo review by Justice Yu Shiraki of
the Supreme Court of Japan:
[I]n many cases, the court of second instance for criminal cases
(koso appeals court), in the course of making reviews, seemed
to have first made its own determination with regard to the fact
findings or sentencing based on the records . . . then compared
its determination with the findings and sentencing made in the
judgment in first instance (the trial court), and changed the
latter if there were any differences, in line with its own
determination. Although this style of making reviews might be
considerably different from what was originally intended, it fit
with the intent of the parties . . . and thus has been well159

See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 2009, 2007 (A) no. 1785, 63 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=995, at sec. II.5.
160
See id. (Jorigome, J., dissenting).
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See id. at sec. II.5.
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See, e.g., Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 16, 2013, 2012 (A) no. 167, 67 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI
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established.163
Japanese appellate courts’ willingness and ability to review and replace both
guilty verdicts and acquittals from the trial level may shock the American
trained lawyer as violating the province of the jury and double jeopardy.164
However, the ability of judges to review and find new facts on appeal is
common in civil law jurisdictions. For example, the same is true in
Germany, although Germany does require a retrial to find new facts.165 This
difference between civil law nations and the common law influenced by the
United States is understandable given the traditional nature of civil law trials.
Further, the trial court has no special advantage in finding facts due to the
absence of lay participants’ input and the fact that no professional judge can
claim special competence to determine facts over any other professional
judge. In the absence of lay participation and the court’s reliance on paper
files to make a determination under traditional civil law models, both trial
and appellate level judges are equally competent to find facts.
With the introduction of lay participation into criminal trials, however,
there is a hierarchy of preferred agents to make factual determinations.
With the introduction of the saiban-in, the trial court and its determinations
as to what occurred belongs to lay participants in the adjudication process.
Applying the same standard of review to judicial and saiban-in findings of
fact on appeal renders superfluous lay participants’ input and undermines the
very contribution that lay participation was intended to make. As a result,
the practice seriously undermines the goals of the saiban-in seido.166
Although judges seem to be respecting lay participants’ input now, the
reviewability of saiban-in found facts on appeal threatens to significantly
dilute the respect that judges give to lay assessors and their participation
during deliberations over time. Allowing appellate circumvention of lay
input increases the ease with which panel judges can slip into listless
explanations of law and procedure to panelists, in the hope that their
guidance will equip them to participate. However, they ultimately rely on
the court of appeals to reverse if the laypersons’ findings are improper. The
fact that a court on koso appeal may replace the contribution of lay
163
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HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] sec. II.1 (Shiraki, J., concurring) (parentheses added), available at http://www.courts.
go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1142
164
Levin, supra note 74, at 212.
165
Id. at 213.
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participants in the judicial system affects the amount of respect judges afford
that contribution and, over the long run, the respect such judges afford the
saiban-in members themselves.
The pre-existing procedural structure into which saiban-in panels
have been placed may be likened to wineskins, and the invigorating
influence of the lay public by way of the saiban-in to new wine poured into
them. Unfortunately, the pre-saiban-in practices that allow judges to reverse
lay participants’ findings are like old wineskins. The old procedure is
inappropriate for the new influence. Just as the old wineskins are prone to
crack and break, allowing the wine to leak out, the old procedure risks the
spoliation of the saiban-in’s potential in the justice system. To enjoy
meaningful exchange between the public and the judiciary and produce a
justice system that enjoys a ‘popular base,’ it is essential that professional
judges regard the contribution of laypersons on saiban-in panels highly, with
the knowledge that the panel’s contribution will have a lasting weight on the
particular case.
In order to preserve the integrity of laypersons’
contributions to the justice system, and for trial judges to continue fostering
a meaningful exchange of ideas and values in deliberations, it is essential
that saiban-in findings not be replaced by professional judges on appeal.
IV.

A DEFERENTIAL STANDARD TO REPLACE SAIBAN-IN FINDINGS IS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM OVER THE LONG RUN

A.

A 2012 Decision by the Supreme Court of Japan Requires Judges to
Give Trial Courts’ Findings of Fact Deference

In 2012, the Supreme Court of Japan decided 2011 (A) 757, a
judgment concerning the meaning of the errors in fact finding provided for
in Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.167 Article 382 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure allows parties to appeal on errors of factual
findings.168 This decision, made three years after the introduction of saibanin panels, is a step in the right direction towards insulating saiban-in
findings from appellate replacement. However, it fails to guarantee the
deference necessary for meaningful exchange between the public and the
judiciary over the long run. A thorough review of the case is necessary to
167
See Saikō Saibanshō [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 13, 2012, 2011 (A) 757, 66 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHŌ KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1142.
168
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explain what the Supreme Court of Japan accomplished through its decision,
and what it failed to do.
In Judgment 2011 (A) 757, Japanese customs officials found nearly
1000 grams of drugs hidden in “chocolate cans” in a man’s169 bag as he
entered Japan through an international airport.170 This man also had five
foreign passports in his possession—some of them forged. 171 The
prosecution charged the man with transporting illegal drugs into Japan by
conspiring with others.172 The main issue at trial was whether or not the
defendant knew that the chocolate cans had drugs in them.173 He argued he
had agreed to transfer stolen passports for a fee, and that he had been given
the chocolate cans as a gift to be given to the recipient (the “recipient”) of
the passports.174
The trial court—a saiban-in panel—acquitted the defendant after it
determined that he was unaware of the drugs. In the opinion of the panel,
the court found that the defendant could not have observed the drugs
because the cans had not been opened. The court so reasoned despite the
fact that the defendant had been concerned that drugs might be inside the
cans, and that the intended recipient of the passports was a known drug
liaison. The court noted that the defendant had an alternative explanation for
coming to Japan that was substantiated by the forged passports.
Furthermore, the court stated that, although the cans were heavy,175 the
defendant had no chance to compare them to others. It also found that while
the defendant had made some inconsistent statements, they could be
explained by a desire to get through customs quickly. Moreover, the court
noted that the defendant’s arguments were corroborated by the fact that the
cans looked normal, as they were placed at the top of the bag (and not the
bottom, like the passports). Lastly, the court stated that the defendant made
no attempt to delay examination of the cans, even though he did attempt to
delay examination of the passports.176
The prosecutor appealed on the grounds that the trial court’s factual
findings were incorrect.177 On appeal, the koso court disagreed with the trial
169
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court’s conclusions.
The koso court found the defendant’s story
unconvincing for several reasons: he changed his statements several times,
he failed to mention the forged passports, he was not confused or resistant
when arrested, and he failed to call the recipient of the passports at trial to
corroborate his story. Instead, he attempted to conceal the relationship.
Finally, the appeals court found it unlikely that the defendant would not have
opened the cans to check for drugs when he had admitted to expressing
concern that there might have been drugs inside. The koso appeals court
reversed the judgment and found the defendant guilty.178 The defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by describing the context of
appellate review:
[T]he court of second instance (the koso appeals court) should
review the judgment in first instance (the trial court) . . . rather
than examin[e] the case itself from the same standpoint [of] the
court of first instance.179
The Court explained that this is because the trial court “directly hear[s]
arguments and examine[s] evidence and . . . hold[s] these procedures
orally.” 180 The Court emphasized that the trial court finds facts
“comprehensively by directly examining the witnesses concerned
[and] . . . determining the credibility of the statements based on their attitude
in giving testimony.”181 The Court specifically highlighted the significance
of lay participation in this process:
This [above mentioned approach] shall apply more
appropriately to a situation where the judges who are to make a
judgment on the case are thoroughly required to directly hear
arguments and examine evidence and to hold these procedures
orally in the first instance upon the introduction of the [s]aibanin (Lay Judge) system.182
Finally, before delving into the appellate court’s opinion and reasons for it,
the Court laid out the specific standard of review that it would apply to the
178
179
180
181
182
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koso court’s determination:
[T]he court of first instance (the trial court) determined the
indirect facts [indicating knowledge] . . . were insufficient to
presume that the accused was aware of the existence of illegal
drugs. Accordingly . . . the (trial court) judgment . . . cannot be
found to contain errors in fact finding unless it is specifically
demonstrated that such judgment in first instance (the trial
court) was unreasonable in light of the rules of logic or rules of
thumb, etc. From this standpoint, we will review the judgment
in prior instance (the appellate decision).183
The Court then moved to address each of the appellate court’s four
findings. The Supreme Court first stated that although the koso court found
that the defendant’s story was unreliable because it had changed, such
change “can be regarded as a circumstance, in general, to . . . abate the
credibility of the accused’s statement,”184 and whether or not the defendant’s
final explanation can be rejected “should be determined in a comprehensive
manner.”185 In response to the appellate court’s findings on the other three
points, the Court stated that the defendant’s behavior and explanations did
not necessarily render his story unreliable, deferring to the trial court’s
determination. The Supreme Court of Japan ultimately concluded that the
court of appeal erred by failing to “sufficiently demonstrate[] that the
holdings of the judgment in first instance [were] unreasonable.”186
The Supreme Court of Japan’s affirmation of the trial court’s special
position to assess creditability and weigh evidence is a strong step in the
right direction towards respecting and shielding lay participants’
contributions to criminal justice.187 This case is significant because the
Court deferred to the trial court’s determination, and specifically referred to
the saiban-in. The Court also invoked the values of “orality and
183
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directness,” 188 which were discussed at length by the JSRC in its
recommendations, and affirmed the special position of the trial court in
fulfilling these values.189 Additionally, the standard the Court used to reject
the koso appeal court’s decision demonstrates the significance of this case.
After it discussed the value of a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence,
the Court rejected the appellate court’s conclusion that the defendant’s
explanation was false because he had changed his statements. It rejected this
conclusion in part because the appellate court did not make its
“determin[ation] in a comprehensive manner.”190 Further, it noted that the
appellate court did not “tak[e] into consideration other specific
circumstances in th[e] case.”191 As the Court had already explained, “fact
finding is expected to be made comprehensively” on the saiban-in level.192
Ultimately, the court rejected the koso appeals court’s finding because it
failed to “sufficiently demonstrate[] that the holdings of the judgment in first
instance (the trial court) [were] unreasonable.”193 As a result, the koso
appeals courts must demonstrate that the saiban-in found facts are
unreasonable in order to reject them.
It is necessary to point out that the decision does not prohibit appellate
courts from finding new facts on appeal. The Court’s laudatory language
about the trial level aside, the decision merely adds an additional hoop
through which judges must leap in order to replace facts. The decision
requires appellate judges to “specifically demonstrate that the findings of the
judgment in first instance are unreasonable.”194 This standard departs from
the near de novo review enjoyed by appellate courts in the past, but fails to
comprehensively protect the public’s contribution. The barrier for appellate
judges to find new facts should be higher in order to effect this protection.
Justice Shiraki stated as much in his concurrence.195 It is insufficient, he
noted, that appellate courts must now consider whether or not the trial
court’s credibility determinations are unreasonable and then demonstrate it
specifically.196 According to Justice Shiraki, the presumption should be in
188
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favor of the saiban-in: “I would like to point out the importance [of] tak[ing]
a stance to consider the determination of the court of first instance as
acceptable unless it is unreasonable.”197 A standard like the one Justice
Shiraki proposes would better protect the saibain-in’s democratic exchange
between the public and the judiciary.
B.

Deferential Standards for Replacing Saiban-in Factual Findings Are
Insufficient to Protect Meaningful Exchange Between the Public and
the Judiciary in the Long Run

Even if the Supreme Court of Japan instituted a new and highly
deferential standard of review for saiban-in findings, the long-term
sustainability of such a standard would remain uncertain because judicial
standards of review are vulnerable to deterioration. While every policy
maker must accept the limited lifespan and temporal applicability of any
new rule or policy, it is easy to imagine a situation in which an initial
attempt to establish a heightened standard of review is followed diligently in
the early years, but over time is diluted by considerations of efficiency and
the desire to make things right in the immediate case.
If a heightened standard of review towards lay participants’ role in the
judiciary in Japan eroded over time, it would not be the first time that such
erosion took place in a modern judiciary. For example, summary judgment
proceedings in the United States were intended to allow civil litigants to
avoid a jury trial when no rational juror could find for the plaintiff.198 It was
originally intended to be a measure employed by judges sparingly;199 when
the proceedings became available to federal judges, they were wary of
granting it. 200 Over time (and after the Supreme Court clarified the
standard), summary judgment came to “stand[] alongside trial and settlement
as a pillar of [the American] system.”201 Modern federal jurisprudence is
“largely the product of summary judgment in civil cases.”202 Strikingly, this
erosion was able to take place in the United States despite constitutional
protections for trial by jury.203
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Presumably legitimate motives have fueled the desire to grant more
summary judgments in the United States—efficiency and the desire to afford
justice more immediately to litigants—rather than have cases draw out
needlessly.204 Similarly, if a highly deferential “no rational juror” standard
was adopted in Japan, pure motives would urge courts of appeal judges to
find that a saiban-in panel had misinterpreted or misunderstood the evidence
when a professional judge believed a different result would have been more
equitable.
V.

NEW WINESKINS FOR NEW WINE: APPELLATE JUDGES SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO REPLACE THE SAIBAN-IN’S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON APPEAL

Patching old wineskins is a short-term fix for a long-term problem.
Encouraging judges to give heightened deference to saiban-in factual
findings, or enforcing a heightened standard of review, is well intentioned
but insufficient to guarantee judicial regard for lay participants’ input in the
long term. Deference is prone to deterioration, and higher standards can be
avoided. To ensure that lay assessors’ decisions have the intended effect on
the cases they decide, and to ensure that the saiban-in seido makes an
enduring contribution to the criminal justice system in the long run, the
Supreme Court of Japan should prohibit appellate courts from replacing
facts on koso appeal.
It should be noted that the decision to maintain koso appeals was
made deliberately. Even while stating “the relevant laws should be modified
to . . . ensure autonomous and meaningful participation by saiban-in,”205 the
JSRC ultimately failed to recommend banning koso appeals.206 The Lay
Assessor/Penal Matters Study Investigation Committee also considered, but
ultimately rejected, a number of options, including: completely barring
factual review on appeal; allowing factual review on appeal but requiring an
annulment of the judgment (and likely a retrial); and incorporating lay
participation on appeal.207 It is possible that the JSRC and Investigation
Committee maintained the koso appeal because reviewability of factual
findings on appeal is common to civil law systems, or because German
criminal procedure specifically allows parties to do so. In Germany,
however, reversals on factual grounds must be tried before a new panel so
204
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that the inviolability of the public’s influence is preserved.208 It may also be
possible that the JSRC, and especially the Investigation Committee,
maintained koso appeals because banning them would be asking too much of
the judiciary. Additionally, the JSRC may have felt that incorporating lay
participation on the trial level is a decision properly made by way of political
processes, and that changes to appellate review and procedure so deep
beneath the surface of the justice system would upset the independence of
the judiciary.
The Supreme Court of Japan is in an ideal position to prohibit judicial
replacement of saiban-in factual findings on appeal because of its legitimacy
and power as the highest court in the land. Barring appellate courts from
replacing facts on koso appeal would not require the creation of any new
appellate process because it would not require the promulgation of any new
laws. Appellate courts would still be able to find error in saiban-in fact
finding, but, when such error were to be found, the court would no longer be
able to independently replace facts. Instead, the koso court would have to
either find the error harmless or remand the case. Although this change
would ultimately require more judicial expenditure in the form of time and
cost for the cases that were remanded, no changes in the current
infrastructure would be necessary to effectuate the change. Furthermore,
knowledge that a finding of error on the saiban-in level would require a new
trial would inhibit many judges from otherwise finding an error—thereby
subconsciously raising the standard for finding factual error.
For saiban-in trials, the Supreme Court of Japan should discontinue
the practice whereby appellate judges replace saiban-in found facts on koso
appeal. Doing so is essential to ensuring that laypersons’ input on particular
cases is safeguarded and that meaningful exchange between the public and
the judiciary continues to occur into the future when the novelty and fanfare
surrounding the new system wear off. In order to effectuate the goals of the
millennium justice reforms and to allow lay participants to “take part
autonomously and meaningfully in deciding trials,”209 the Supreme Court of
Japan should prohibit courts of appeal from replacing facts found by saibanin panels during trial.
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